Working papers

Pathways to Democracy with J. Doucette

Why do some democratic transitions last? Different pathways to democracy have been theorized to result in lasting transitions, emphasizing, for instance, the importance of developing state capacity prior to democratization. This letter argues that the empirical specifications used in much applied work are not appropriate for testing such pathway explanations. To illustrate this, we examine the pathway version of modernization theory using theoretically guided specifications and subsequently compare them to conventional specifications. Substantively, the analysis reveals i) that higher socioeconomic development put countries on a path towards either stable autocracy or stable democracy and ii) that the path to stable democracy becomes more likely than stable autocracy at higher levels of development. This differs from conventional specifications that find no relationship between development and transitions to democracy and a positive relationship between post-transition development and regime stability. These results underscore the importance of ensuring consistency between empirical specification and theoretical argument.

From Disparity to Grievance: Comparing the Effects of Interethnic and Interpersonal Inequality with L. F. Aarslew L. F. and M. E. Christensen.

Macrolevel research indicates that interethnic inequalities are more likely than interpersonal inequalities to incite collective grievances, conflict, and instability. However, the microlevel processes driving this destabilizing effect remain underexamined. We hypothesize that raising awareness among disadvantaged groups about actual inequality levels intensifies perceptions and feelings of injustice and that ethnic disparities elicit particularly strong reactions. To test this, we conducted survey experiments in the US (N = 3,000), India (N = 1,600), and South Africa (N = 1,600). Our findings indicate that exposure to real-world inequality consistently leads to perceptions of greater injustice in the economic distribution and intensifies feelings of anger and frustration related to it. However, we find only partial support for the idea that intergroup inequality is perceived as more unfair and evokes stronger feelings of injustice than interpersonal inequality.

Dynamics of Regime Change: A New Dataset on Actors, Actions, and Ambitions with D. Andersen and SE. Skaaning

We present a new dataset, specifying the dynamics of regime change for all democratic transitions and breakdowns from 1789 to 2022. Existing datasets primarily focus on the basic distinction between democracy and autocracy and their associated institutions. While some do address various types of regime change, they tend to cover only a limited range of dynamics or rely on compound categories that lack a clear specification of the underlying components. Our dataset breaks standards by comprehensively coding the dynamics of regime change, capturing the roles of leading, supporting, and opposing actors, their actions, the nature of mobilization and violence, and the underlying justifications. It includes highly transparent procedures comprising disaggregated indicators, explicit case-specific coding rationales, and certainty estimates. This dataset facilitates nuanced and robust studies of the causes and consequences of regime change.

Democracy on the Horizon: Strategic Welfare Expansions Before Transition with C. Jensen

Democratization is commonly expected to reduce economic inequality, as political inclusion empowers the less affluent. However, empirical studies have struggled to find a robust link between democratization and equality, posing a significant puzzle for social science. This project offers a novel explanation by focusing on redistributive social policies implemented in the decade preceding democratization. Drawing on case studies and descriptive statistics, we identify two pathways driving welfare expansions before democratic transitions: anticipated competition, where autocratic incumbents introduce popular policies to prepare for democratic elections, and failed concessions, where autocratic welfare reforms aim to stabilize regimes but fail to prevent democratization. These findings challenge the assumption that redistributive changes occur primarily after democratization, highlighting strategic policy dynamics during transitional periods. Our study contributes to understanding distributive politics during regime change and enriches the literature on autocratic welfare states, emphasizing the anticipatory and strategic nature of welfare reforms under autocratic rule. 

Keeping What They Promise? Examining the Effects of Revolutions on Inequality 

Revolutionaries frequently claim that they will reduce inequality and create a more just society. Yet, research on the outcomes of revolutions remains contradictory, with arguments pointing in both directions. This paper conducts a systematic quantitative examination of the consequences of revolutions for inequality, distinguishing between social and political revolutions. Using time-series, cross-national data spanning 1900–2015 and a multidimensional approach to inequality—including socioeconomic, ethnic, gender, and urban-rural dimensions—the analysis  reveals stark contrasts between revolutionary types. Social revolutions lead to significant and sustained reductions in inequality across several dimensions. In contrast, the effects of political revolutions are weaker and less consistent, with limited evidence of substantial redistributive impacts. Moreover, social revolutions' egalitarian gains are not accompanied by increased prosperity or political freedoms.

Diversitet, Ulighed og Demokratisk Tilbagegang (In Danish) 

To faktorer, der ofte sættes i forbindelse med demokratisk ustabilitet og tilbagegang, er økonomisk ulighed og etnisk diversitet. I denne artikel gennemgår jeg systematisk den komparative forskning og viser, at de simple antagelser om, at etnisk diversitet eller økonomisk ulighed i sig selv underminerer demokrati, ikke understøttes robust af empirien. Begge dele kan under visse omstændigheder gøde jorden for udemokratiske tendenser, men det kræver, at etniske eller økonomiske skel politiseres og bliver til egentlige konfliktlinjer. På den baggrund diskuterer jeg en nyere gren af litteraturen, der ikke behandler ulighed og etnicitet som adskilte spørgsmål, men i stedet kombinerer dem. Gennemgangen af disse studier viser bl.a., at socioøkonomisk ulighed mellem etniske grupper er særligt destabiliserende – mere end økonomisk ulighed eller etnisk diversitet alene. Jeg præsenterer derudover to casestudier af hhv. Nepal og Bolivia, som yderligere belyser de mekanismer, hvorigennem etnisk ulighed kan underminere demokratiske institutioner. Implikationen er, at etnisk diversitet primært undergraver demokratiske institutioner, når den overlapper med materielle og politiske uligheder.